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Introduction

The call came in at 2305 to the operations center at Coast Guard Marine Safety
This simple scenario begs a series of questions with respect to command and control 1 between the United States Coast Guard and the United States Navy in the related realms of maritime homeland security and maritime homeland defense. Are existing command and control relationships appropriate, adequate, and effective for addressing emerging national maritime homeland security and defense concerns? Are they clearly defined and wellunderstood? How, if at all, should these relationships be modified? What types of organizational and definitional changes are needed to make command and control more effective and more responsive to the demands of maritime homeland security and defense?
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, is it appropriate (or even possible) to draw a clear and distinct dividing line between homeland security and homeland defense in the maritime environment? Where does one mission begin and the other end, and what should be the respective responsibilities of the Coast Guard and the Navy?
The answers to these questions are of critical concern to higher echelon commanders in both the Coast Guard and the Navy in that they directly address the efficiency and effectiveness of efforts to ensure both maritime homeland security and defense in the United States. Suppose, for example, that the fictional scenario that opened this paper had ended with the discovery of a large explosive device and the detection of an intricate plot to attack a number of major U.S. commercial seaports. Consider, moreover, that such attacks might take a variety of forms, including the use of commercial oceangoing cargo ships as weapons to destroy critical infrastructure or deny port access. Clear answers to each of the questions posed would be of vital concern to Coast Guard and Navy operational level commanders as they sorted out responsibilities and contemplated potential courses of action. This paper will contend that the answers to these questions are largely incomplete and inadequate. It will further argue that there is a need to unify the maritime homeland defense and maritime homeland security missions. This would drive the Navy and the Coast Guard to develop a joint command and control structure for maritime homeland security and defense. Such a structure would provide for unity of effort in the maritime environment and would help to eliminate confusion over the boundary between security and defense. It would additionally allow the Coast Guard, as the lead federal agency (LFA) 2 for maritime homeland security, to have immediate access to, and control over, certain specified Navy assets when circumstances required. It would establish clearly defined situations in which Coast Guard operational commanders would have a direct and permanent command and control link to the Navy to access these assets for support of Coast Guard maritime homeland security missions.
At the same time, it would firmly establish the link to the Navy to access Coast Guard assets as necessary for maritime defense missions.
The question of operational level command and control relationships between the Coast Guard and the Navy is far reaching and touches many different aspects of joint operations. This analysis, however, will be confined specifically to the command and control structure for maritime homeland security and defense. It is in this realm that the concerns are perhaps the most vexing and in which the command and control relationships between the Coast Guard and the Navy are most in need of clear definition and exposition. Homeland security is defined as a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism, and minimize the damage and assist in the recovery from terrorist attacks.
On the other hand, the Defense Department defines homeland defense as the military protection of United States territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression. It also includes routine, steady state activities designed to deter aggressors and to prepare U.S. military forces for action if deterrence fails. With respect to homeland security, the Defense Department will operate in support of a lead federal agency. While in homeland defense activities, the Defense Department will take the lead and be supported by other federal agencies.
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This explanation followed an earlier outline by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld of the circumstances in which the DOD would be involved in activity in the United States.
First, under extraordinary circumstances that require the department to execute its traditional military missions. In these circumstances, DOD would take the . . . The second and third categories, which are really emergency or temporary circumstances, in which other federal agencies take the lead, and DOD lends support, are appropriately described as homeland security.
12
Analysis
If one excludes the maritime environment for a moment from the discussion, then these explanations of the distinctions between homeland defense and homeland security make sense. It seems clear that civil authorities (whether federal, state or local) would take the lead in response to events such as the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, with DOD providing support as requested and required. It also seems clear that the events of 11 September were so extraordinary that they crossed the line into a homeland defense mission.
There are, besides, a substantial number of civil agencies and organizations at all levels of government with resources, capabilities and legal authorities to address the prevention and response demands of homeland security on domestic soil. To be sure, the work of coordinating this multitude of entities has barely begun and poses some daunting challenges, but the point remains that there are numerous directions to turn for needed capabilities.
Homeland security and defense in the maritime environment, in contrast, are difficult missions to separate. Unlike in the domestic (landside) environment, the maritime arena is one in which the boundary can shift depending upon the threat. For example, suppose authorities discover a plot to detonate a weapon of mass destruction in a major U.S. seaport.
Suppose further that this weapon is on board a container ship currently at sea and bound for that seaport. How should this threat be classified? Is it a matter for homeland security or for homeland defense? Does it begin as a defense mission and transition to a matter of homeland security, or is it the other way around? Is there a geographic point at which the transition would occur?
13 How exactly would the transition occur? To a large extent the Navy and the Coast Guard understand their missions at the extremes. Forward projection, 200 nautical miles from the U.S. and beyond, intuitively belongs to the Navy. The Coast Guard for its part "owns" the ports and navigable waterways of the U.S. out to 12 nautical miles. In between, though, is a large expanse of coastal waters that remain in question. Is patrolling these U.S. coastal waters a Coast Guard or Navy mission, or is it somehow shared?
These are not trivial or inconsequential questions. Given that the Navy and the Coast Guard are the two primary authorities in the U.S. maritime environment, the answers to these questions are critically important in determining who leads, who supports and how to ensure an effective response-and an effective hand-off, if necessary-before the ship reaches the United States.
To be fair, planners at NORTHCOM have attempted to define a homeland securityhomeland defense continuum for the maritime environment in an effort to clarify this issue.
14 This continuum is envisioned as one that begins with maritime homeland security and escalates to homeland defense as both the threat and the force used to meet the threat increase. The transition from homeland security to homeland defense occurs at the point at which the Coast Guard and other law enforcement authorities are unable to stop the threat.
This raises still more questions, however. Where in this continuum is the Navy and Coast Guard command and control nexus? How does jurisdictional authority transition along the continuum? How are resources allocated and will the Coast Guard find it difficult or cumbersome to reach into the Navy for assets while the response is still in the homeland security phase? There are no clear answers yet to such questions, but a modification in the approach to maritime security and defense coupled with a common command and control structure could begin the process of finding answers.
There are in fact a number of existing Navy command and control structures into which the Coast Guard fits when operating in support of Navy missions. (Joint task forces for example.) These relationships were developed over the years in operating environments in which the Coast Guard and the Navy acted largely independent of one another, except for certain well-established military missions in direct support of Navy forces. These are traditional, historical models 15 of interaction and are primarily military in focus. For the most part, though, they are not well designed for the closer and more integrated relationship exclusive domestic law enforcement authority within the 12 nautical mile U.S. Territorial Sea. The Navy could be assigned homeland defense responsibility for waters 200 nautical miles and beyond. 14 See Appendix B. 15 The Maritime Defense Zone (MARDEZ) commands are examples. These are discussed in more detail in subsequent paragraphs.
necessary for effective coordination of activities in support of maritime homeland security and defense.
Indeed, the command and control relationships between the Coast Guard and the Navy tend to have been formed primarily to address the Navy's need for support of their traditional missions. Such support includes missions like force protection, military outload supervision and periodic augmentation of Navy forces. In each of these supporting roles, the Coast Guard either has maintained its independence from the Navy or has shifted operational control of its units to the Navy, but has not created a permanent joint command and control system. The Navy has retained operational command and control of its forces since they have owned the missions.
Such a unidirectional command and control relationship is inadequate for the new demands of maritime homeland security and defense, where rapid and effective responses to security threats may mean the difference between safety and catastrophe. The Coast Guard mission in this area will at times require direct support from the Navy. This may take a number of forms: identifying and intercepting hostile vessels, providing specialized assets for response to unique threats or gathering and processing intelligence data. Yet, current command and control relationships complicate this in that they are unclear, inconsistent and tend to be formed on an ad hoc basis, as in the fictional scenario that opened this discussion.
Although few doubt that a Coast Guard operational commander would get Navy assistance when needed, to get this support officially under current guidelines requires a request for assistance that must travel up the entire Coast Guard chain of command to the Separate and somewhat competing planning efforts to change the structure and mission profiles of both the MDZs and the JIATFs to address the maritime homeland defense mission are in fact already in process. These planning efforts, however, raise some concerns which will be addressed following a brief outline of each of these two command constructs. Although the MDZ domestic mission is largely dormant at present, the MDZs still have active duty Navy and Coast Guard personnel assigned. Indeed, planners are working on a draft of an updated MOA between the Navy and the Coast Guard to yet again redefine the 20 It is interesting to note that the MDZ was not activated during the response to the September 11 th attacks-a vivid illustration of this change in focus of the MDZ mission from domestic coastal defense to support of foreign expeditionary forces. 21 The information on Maritime Defense Zones was compiled and condensed from a September 2000 report by Karen D. Smith and Nancy F. Nugent. The Role of the Maritime Defense Zone in the 21 st Century. Alexandria, VA: The Center for Naval Analyses, September 2000. mission and functions of the MDZ and to align the MDZs with the renewed demand for maritime homeland defense. This draft contains a notional command and control structure for maritime homeland defense that would establish four standing but inactive commands (Coast Guard Forces East and West, and Navy Fleet East and West) reporting directly to NAVNORTH. Under the proposal, one or more of these could be activated for maritime homeland defense missions. They would have no forces allotted and no authority to assign or control forces until the Secretary of Defense specified a maritime homeland defense mission, but their structure would provide a direct Coast Guard and Navy command and control interface. The MDZ construct may serve as an ideal, well-established and longstanding answer to the need for a restructured Coast Guard and Navy command and control interface for maritime homeland defense and security. Agency. The mission of each JIATF is to "plan, conduct, and direct interagency detection, monitoring, and sorting operations of air and maritime drug smuggling activities."
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The JIATF has proven itself to be a successful and capable organization and a model of interagency cooperation and coordination. As such it has been a tempting and logical choice for NORTHCOM planners to turn to in their search for existing organizational models to adapt for the maritime homeland defense mission. 25 In fact, at a recent NORTHCOM coordinating the work of the many agencies involved in maritime homeland defense and security.
A primary concern with each of these organizations in their current (and proposed) forms is that their focus is primarily upon maritime homeland defense. Whereas each of these proposals provides the Coast Guard with an important entry to the Navy chain of command, neither explicitly addresses the maritime homeland security mission nor how the Navy would support the Coast Guard's efforts in this. The Coast Guard entry in the chain of command may only serve to ensure that their forces will be more easily accessed when needed. Furthermore, neither proposal recognizes the potential for confusion between maritime homeland defense and maritime homeland security as discussed earlier, nor provides a specified list of available forces for support of these missions.
This Navy focus on maritime homeland defense is an additional concern for the Coast Guard in that it drives the Navy to plan for its own operations and to look to the Coast Guard mostly for supporting forces. It is understandable that this should be the case. Without a formal doctrinal approach, along with a more bi-directional method of shared command and control, the Coast Guard will likely always find itself primarily in a supporting role to the Navy. The demands on the Navy to plan for a forward defense make Coast Guard reliance on ad hoc force support arrangements untenable, particularly in light of the post-September 11 th security burden.
Some could claim that this issue of command and control does not really pose as serious a problem as proposed. Indeed, it could be argued that the work being done by Navy planners to alter existing organizational models has addressed the concern in a way that will Finally, it might be asserted that the current ad hoc arrangement between the Coast Guard and the Navy has worked well enough and that the Coast Guard has always managed to get the support it needs to meet its mission requirements.
However, the focus on organizational change (as in the proposed MDZ and JIATF constructs) is still being approached from the perspective of maritime homeland defense and as such cannot help but be biased toward Navy needs and requirements. Improved command and control interfaces, interoperability and data sharing are important, but cannot by themselves institute doctrinal changes in the ways in which agencies interact. Innovative developments can improve existing organizations, but they aren't going to change the basic modes of interaction. Ad hoc arrangements and personality driven cooperation may have worked well in lower threat environments, but such approaches are no longer adequate for ensuring a robust federal response to maritime homeland security and defense. They do not begin to answer the many questions raised over how best to ensure security and defense in the maritime environment.
Recommendations
The Navy and Coast Guard should unify the maritime homeland defense and maritime homeland security missions. This would remove the artificial boundary that currently exists, help to eliminate confusion over responsibilities and drive the development of a common command and control structure for maritime homeland defense AND security.
Unification of the missions would further compel the Navy and the Coast Guard to jointly determine shortfalls, judge performance gaps and identify assets needed for mission accomplishment. A unified mission would allow for more seamless interaction between the two services and would facilitate the process of determining the best methods for ensuring security and defense in the maritime environment.
In conjunction with this, the Navy and the Coast Guard should expand the proposed MDZ concept illustrated in Appendix C to include this unified maritime mission in order to develop a robust command and control architecture for the maritime environment. This will allow for a clear understanding of roles, a bi-directional command and control relationship and a focused distribution of maritime assets. It will help to remove confusion over whose role it is to act in any given situation and will give the Coast Guard a command and control reach directly into the Navy. It will create a permanent forum in which to consider the questions posed earlier in this paper.
Conclusion
The unification of the maritime homeland security and defense missions coupled with clearly defined command and control relationships between the Navy and the Coast Guard are especially important with respect to the security of our nation's seaports. 30 Each of these posed a unique and specific threat as a target of interest and opportunity for terrorists. Added to the threat on the vessel side is the concern for the security of the shore-based facilities and terminals that receive these ships.
The United States is only just beginning to assess its true vulnerabilities in the maritime environment. Recent studies have brought forth alarming concerns about the minimal levels of security and cargo oversight in U.S ports, the hazards posed by modern commercial cargo ships and the ease with which terrorists could exploit these weaknesses.
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There is justifiable apprehension about the extent of the vulnerability of U.S. seaports to terrorist attack. Such apprehension argues strongly for the development of as robust a federal effort as possible to respond to the myriad of potential maritime threats that exist.
Maritime homeland security and maritime homeland defense travel jointly along a continuum that begins when a vessel is loaded overseas and ends when it reaches a U.S. port.
There is no clear line in the ocean separating one from the other. The U.S. needs all of its maritime assets focused jointly and directly on this critical maritime mission. Together, the Coast Guard and the Navy can ensure that this will be the case. 
